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POLITICAL ISSUES AND THE VOTE: NOVEMBER, 1952

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In March, 1952 the Carnegie Corporation made available to the Social Science Research Council a research grant to support a major study of factors influencing the popular vote in the 1952 presidential election. Under the sponsorship of the Council's Committee on Political Behavior¹ this project is currently being carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.

The study was developed around six major objectives:

1. To identify the voters and non-voters, Republicans and Democrats, within four major geographical areas, in regard to
 - a. socio-economic characteristics;
 - b. attitudes and opinions on political issues;
 - c. perceptions of the parties and the candidates.
2. To compare these groups to the corresponding groups in the 1948 presidential election.
3. To trace the resolution of the vote with particular attention to the undecided and changing voters.
4. To study the impact of the activities of the major parties on the population.
5. To analyze the nature and correlates of political party identification.
6. To analyze the nature and correlates of political participation.

Data designed to meet these objectives were gathered by means of nation-wide sample surveys conducted in October and November, 1952. Two thousand and twenty-one persons, chosen by methods of probability sampling to represent all citizens of voting age living in private households in the United States, were interviewed by the Survey Research Center field staff shortly before the election; 1614 of these people were interviewed again shortly after the election.² The data of the present article are all based on the sample of 1614 people who were interviewed both before and after the election.

It is apparent that the full analysis of the data of this study will require many months. No major publication from the project is expected before 1954. However, because of the unusual interest in the study, it has seemed desirable to prepare one segment of the data for publication at the earliest possible date in order to acquaint students of political behavior with the nature of the project.

¹The members of the SSRC Committee on Political Behavior are V. O. Key (chairman), Conrad M. Arensberg, Angus Campbell, Alfred de Grazia, Oliver Garceau, Avery Leiserson, M. Brewster Smith, and David B. Truman. The Committee is in no way responsible for the present article.

²Two hundred and twenty-two of the original 2021 respondents, who constituted an extra loading of the sample in the Far West, were dropped from the November sample. An additional 185 respondents could not be reinterviewed. Statements of the sample design and sampling errors and copies of the questionnaires may be obtained from the Survey Research Center upon request.

and of the kinds of analysis which are being carried out. The present article was prepared with this purpose in view.

THE OBJECTIVES

Studies of political behavior and particularly sample surveys related to voting behavior have demonstrated that during recent years the followers of the two major political parties have differed substantially in their views on the pressing issues of the day.³ In 1948, for example, the amendment of the Taft-Hartley Labor Act became an issue of such heat that it divided Republican and Democratic voters almost as clearly as the question as to who was to become president. It has recently been proposed that party identification and attitudes on partisan issues may exercise reciprocal relationships producing uniformity among party followers, some identifying with the party because of its stand on issues, others adopting positions on issues in order to conform to party position.⁴

The major purpose of the present article is to make available new data concerning the role of political issues in a presidential election campaign. Although a short appendix presents data showing the voting records of the major demographic groupings in the 1948 and 1952 elections, the primary intent of the article is to carry further than has hitherto been possible the analysis of the relationship of the voter's attitudes on partisan issues to his actual vote.

Limitations of space and the preliminary state of our analysis preclude any exhaustive treatment of the relation of issues to voting behavior in the recent election. We will concentrate, therefore, on two of the most striking characteristics of the 1952 vote—the unusually large turnout, and the shift to the Republicans after a generation of Democratic rule—and attempt to show how these phenomena were related to the issues covered in this study. The first two sections of this article, therefore, will be mainly concerned with the following two questions:

How were issues related to the movement of citizens from the passivity of non-voting into the act of voting in the 1952 presidential election?

How were issues related to changes in voting behavior whereby blocs of voters were lost by one party and gained by another party?

In addition to the study of campaign issues, another familiar method of analyzing the presidential vote has been through comparison of the voting records of various easily defined sub-groupings of the national electorate. Past research has corroborated common-sense impressions that, during the last twenty years, there has been a tendency for labor union members, college educated people, residents of large cities, farmers, Catholics, Southerners and members of other such social classifications to cast their votes rather predomi-

³ Angus Campbell and R. L. Kahn, *The People Elect a President* (Ann Arbor, 1952); Warren E. Miller, "Party Preference and Attitudes on Political Issues: 1948-1951," *this REVIEW*, Vol. 47, pp. 45-60 (March, 1953).

⁴ George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes toward Foreign Policy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 15, pp. 601-23 (Winter, 1951-52).

nontheorist for
ward by Lazarsfeld and his associates that voting may be largely understood
as an expression of the individual's conformance to his basic sociological en-
vironment.⁵

Although these relationships between socio-economic groupings and the vote have usually been considered separately from the relationships between campaign issues and the vote, the two analytic approaches overlap in many ways. As politicians have recognized in shifting their arguments to suit their audience, many issues have differential meaning and importance for different segments of the population. An analysis which systematically examines the differential relation between issues and the vote in different sub-groupings of the national electorate should provide added insight both into the meaning of the issues and the reasons for intergroup voting differences. Although such a systematic analysis is beyond the scope of the present report, some preliminary data bearing on this problem will be presented. The third section of this report will be mainly concerned with the following question:

Were the relationships between specified issues and voting behavior in the 1952 election essentially the same for all major sections of the electorate or were there important differences between people in different socio-economic groupings?

THE DATA

A full investigation of public attitudes on the political issues of the 1952 campaign would have required a very extensive interview devoted entirely to this objective. Because of the pressure of other interests it was decided to restrict this aspect of the present study to seven questions, three relating to domestic issues and four to foreign policy issues.⁶ They were asked as part of the pre-election interview. These questions were chosen on an *a priori* basis as representing areas of relatively clear party difference and covering a broad range of governmental activities.

A major characteristic of the items is that they are all issues on which the Truman Administration accepted responsibility for a particular position. Adherence to this criterion means, of course, that these particular questions cannot be thought of as a representative sample of all the questions which might have been asked concerning the issues of the campaign. It will be noted, for example, that no inquiries were made regarding "corruption" or "communism in government" although these accusations were prominently featured in the oratory of the campaign.⁷ The questions were selected with the following broad considerations in mind: The issues should encompass fundamental, long term party differences (e.g., governmental social welfare activity, U. S. foreign in-

⁵ Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York, 1948).

⁶ The seven questions are reproduced in Appendix II along with a detailed statement as to how the answers to these questions were categorized for purposes of the present analysis.

⁷ A separate analysis of the importance of these charges, based on the coding of certain open-ended questions in the interview, will be included in a later report.

vovement), they should tap both ideological orientations and the less sophisticated "bread and butter" reactions (e.g., Taft-Hartley, FEPC, U. S. entry in the Korean war), and they should provide information on recent partisan controversies (e.g., U. S. China policy, current U. S. Korean policy).

It is possible that a different choice of questions might have yielded results different from those which are presented here. However, the questions which were used were chosen because they bore on issues which appeared to be of major significance and it is not probable that other questions bearing on these same issues would have yielded substantially different results.

Each of the seven questions was scored as to whether the respondent expressed an opinion supporting the policy of the Truman Administration or opposing it. For each question there were some respondents who did not offer a clearly pro- or anti-Democratic opinion, either because they knew nothing about the question (as in the case of the Taft-Hartley Act) or because they did not hold any clearly partisan position regarding it. In the presentations which follow, the proportions of supporting, opposing and neutral-uncertain responses total to 100 per cent for each of the groupings which is being represented. For the convenience of the reader, an Index of Partisanship is also included. This is obtained by subtracting the proportion of responses opposing the Democratic position from the proportion supporting it.

Each of the respondents was asked in the November interview how he had voted on November 4th. Seventy-four per cent of the sample said they had voted.⁸ The two-party division of their two-party vote was 58 per cent for Eisenhower and 42 per cent for Stevenson, indicating a slight bias in favor of Eisenhower but well within the sampling error of the survey. When the opinions of these Democratic and Republican voters on the seven issues are compared it is possible to see the extent to which these particular questions divided the followers of the two parties (Table I).

The absolute values which are presented in this and the following tables are much less important for the present analysis than the relation of these values to each other. The significant conclusion to be drawn from Table I is the fact that on all of the seven questions Democrats and Republicans, taken as total groups, differ in their opinions and differ in the direction of their party position. Throughout the seven issues one finds more Democratic than Republican voters supporting Democratic policies. On four of the items there is both a preponderance of Democratic support for Democratic policies and, at the same time, a comparable balance of Republican opposition to the same policies.

It will be noted that the issue of FEPC was least discriminative of all the seven issues in separating Democratic and Republican voters. Attitudes on this issue are also found to have markedly different relationships to voting patterns than do attitudes on the other six issues. Because of the unique character of this

⁸ It must be remembered that the sample excluded the institutional population, the "floating" population, people living in military establishments, etc. Such people are estimated to total nearly ten million and it may be safely assumed that they are very largely non-voters.

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TABLE I. THE RE
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Issue	Vote— 1952
Governmental social welfare activity	D R
Taft-Hartley	D R
FEPC	D R
U. S. foreign involvement	D R
U. S. China policy	D R
U. S. entry in Korean war	D R
U. S. Korean policy	D R

Number of cases: Democ
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orientations and the less so *issue*, possibly resulting from its strong racial and regional components, it is not included in the analysis which follows. A detailed statement of the interrelations of all the issues studied will be presented in a subsequent report.

TABLE I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 1952 VOTE FOR PRESIDENT AND ATTITUDES ON SEVEN 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	Vote—1952	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	D	33%	62	5	100%	+28
	R	19%	50	31	100%	-12
Taft-Hartley	D	32%	56	12	100%	+20
	R	9%	55	36	100%	-27
FEPC	D	51%	4	45	100%	+6
	R	40%	6	54	100%	-14
U.S. foreign involvement	D	43%	13	44	100%	-1
	R	28%	7	65	100%	-37
U.S. China policy	D	60%	23	17	100%	+43
	R	38%	24	38	100%	0
U.S. entry in Korean war	D	52%	16	32	100%	+20
	R	34%	20	46	100%	-12
Current U. S. Korean policy	D	52%	7	41	100%	+11
	R	36%	8	56	100%	-20

Number of cases: Democratic voters—494
Republican voters—687

and the following table shows the relation of these variables. As shown from Table I is the relation of these variables. Republicans, taken as a whole, are more Democratic than Republican voters. There is both a preponderance of Democrats and, at the same time, a preponderance of Republicans on the same policies.

most discriminative of all the voters. Attitudes on relationships to voting patterns are the unique character of

institutional population, etc. Such people are said that they are very

The regular voters.

1. The regular Democrats, people who voted for the Democratic presidential nominee in both the 1948 and 1952 elections, hereafter referred to as DD's (362 cases).

2. The regular Republicans, people who voted for the Republican nominee in both 1948 and 1952, hereafter referred to as RR's (385 cases).

⁹ The authors are aware of the dangers of error in recalling a vote cast four years previously. Examination of the data on the reported 1948 votes shows evidence of some random error in report, but no serious systematic error. The question on 1948 vote was asked in the pre-election interview.

The new voters.

3. The new Democrats, people who did not vote in 1948, either because of age or other reasons, but who voted Democratic in 1952, hereafter referred to as ND's (104 cases).

4. The new Republicans, people who did not vote in 1948 but voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as NR's (125 cases).

The switching voters.

5. The Democrats turned Republican, people who had voted Democratic in 1948 but who voted Republican in 1952, hereafter referred to as DR's (165 cases).¹⁰

I. THE NEW VOTERS

The data of the survey show that those voters of 1952 who were non-voters in 1948 were composed, about one to three, of young people eligible to vote for the first time and older people who, for one reason and another, had not voted in the 1948 election. Both classes of new voters voted in very nearly the same proportions as did the rest of the population, the young people giving General Eisenhower a 57-43 majority of their two-party vote, and their older counterparts voting 53-47 for Republican electors. Inasmuch as the divisions within these two groups were not significantly different from the division within the rest of the population, it is apparent that, given no other changes, the elimination of the 1948 non-voters from the 1952 electorate would not have altered the proportionate distribution of the popular vote.

The fact that both these classes of new voters followed the national trend very closely in their choice of candidates indicates that they were not activated into the role of voters by any common point of view regarding current issues. On the contrary, it would appear that the ND's and the NR's must have differed about as much in their perceptions and attitudes as did the rest of the voters.

In order to reveal the possible relationships which may have existed in these groups between positions taken on the issues with which this study deals and preferences for one or the other candidate, it is necessary to compare the opinions expressed by the ND's and the NR's in answer to the different questions asked. This is done in Table II, which also includes the responses given by the "regular" voters, DD's and RR's.

An overall inspection of this table makes apparent a clear polarity in partisan attitudes on each question, with a strong tendency toward a pro-Democratic position among the DD's and an anti-Democratic position among the RR's. The ND's tend to resemble the DD's and the NR's to resemble the RR's.

It will be noted that the ND's are more consistently similar to their DD associates than the NR's are to the RR's. The distributions of the ND opinions differ only slightly from those of the DD's, in two cases appearing to be slightly more partisanly Democratic than the DD's and in the other four cases some-

¹⁰ There were also a few people who had voted Republican in 1948 but who voted Democratic in 1952. Their number was too small to warrant statistical analysis.

less. On the other hand, the ND's and the RR's are generally more clearly Republican than the DD's. When one considers the positions on individual issues, it may be seen that the ND's are more social welfare activity, Ta-

TABLE II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POSITIONS ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND ATTITUDES

Issue	1948-1952 Vote
Governmental social welfare activity	DD ND NR RR
Mr. Hartley	DD ND NR RR
Foreign involvement	DD ND NR RR
China policy	DD ND NR RR
Entry in Korean war	DD ND NR RR
U. S. Korean policy	DD ND NR RR

on Korean war) show a more Democratic attitudes. U. S. Korean policy about the relationship is most tenuous. Only one issue, U. S. relationship as a group t-

less. On the other hand, the differences between the distributions of the NR's and the RR's are generally larger and in every case the NR's tend to be less clearly Republican than the RR's.

When one considers the positions of the previously non-voting groups on individual issues, it may be seen that for the ND group four issues (governmental social welfare activity, Taft-Hartley Act, U. S. China policy, and U. S. en-

TABLE II. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948-1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	ND	37%	52	11	100%	+26
	NR	29%	49	22	100%	+7
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	-24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	ND	27%	63	10	100%	+17
	NR	13%	63	24	100%	-11
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	-37
U.S. foreign involvement	DD	44%	11	45	100%	-1
	ND	46%	13	41	100%	+5
	NR	31%	7	62	100%	-31
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	-46
U.S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	ND	51%	24	25	100%	+26
	NR	43%	24	33	100%	+10
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	-12
U.S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	ND	58%	14	28	100%	+30
	NR	36%	21	43	100%	-7
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	-19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	ND	46%	3	51	100%	-5
	NR	46%	4	50	100%	-4
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	-28

try in Korean war) show a significantly larger number of pro-Democratic than anti-Democratic attitudes. On the questions of U. S. foreign involvement and current U. S. Korean policy the ND's are so evenly split as to make any statement about the relationship between attitudes on those questions and behavior in voting most tenuous.

On only one issue, U. S. foreign involvement, did the NR's show greater partisanship as a group than did members of the ND group. On most of the




FIG. 1. Change in relationships between summary scores on campaign issues and presidential vote: 1948-1952.*

Score: Number of responses supporting Democratic policies divided by the total number of responses supporting and opposing Democratic policies.

- * ND 1948: Usual non-voters voting Democratic in 1948
- ND 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
- DD 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Democratic in 1948
- DD 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Democratic in 1952
- DR 1948: Usual Democratic voters who voted Republican in 1948
- DR 1952: Democratic voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
- RR 1948: Usual Republican voters who voted Republican in 1948
- RR 1952: Republican voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952
- NR 1948: Usual non-voters who voted Republican in 1948
- NR 1952: Non-voters of 1948 who voted Republican in 1952

usual non-participants from leaving their firesides to vote. In the absence of magnetic candidates or an exciting campaign, it may be argued that those usual non-voters who did vote in 1948 must have done so because of party loyalty or out of personal concern over particular political issues. If this supposition is valid, it then follows that the ND's and NR's of 1948 were largely party followers who knew the party line on the campaign issues; or they were citizens drawn into the political conflict primarily because of the issues. In any event, the ND's and NR's in a year of abnormally low turnout proved to be well aware of the political implications of their attitudes on issues and an unmistak-

ably high relationship between their stand on issues and the direction of their vote resulted.

When the 1952 side of Figure 1 is examined it is seen that the degree of resemblance of the two groups of "new" voters to their "regular" counterparts is not the same as it had been in 1948. The attitudes of the ND's appear to be only slightly less Democratic in their direction than are those of the DD's. The NR's, however, who had been particularly partisan in 1948, were very near an even division in their attitudes in 1952.

The 1952 campaign differed from that of 1948 in a number of important respects. It presented two new candidates, one of whom was one of the most widely known and respected men in contemporary American life. It was featured by an intensity of campaigning and general political activity far beyond that of 1948. It was distinguished by the prominence of charges against the party in power, charges which were not issues in the sense used in this article but accusations of "corruption," "communist infiltration" and the like. It brought into focus more acutely than had been the case in 1948 the problem of over-extended one-party rule, the "time for a change" argument.

If it is surmised that the impact of these non-issue elements of the 1952 campaign was favorable to the Republican candidate, the issue positions of the ND and NR groups are not difficult to understand. It is known that the pool of 1948 non-voters, from which both the ND's and NR's came, was largely Democratic in usual party preference.¹² It was this fact that gave rise to the popular supposition before the 1952 election that an increase in turnout would be advantageous to the Democrats. If the "new" voters in 1952 had come into the ranks of voters solely on the basis of party loyalty or party-linked issues, their total vote would very likely have favored the Democratic candidate. However, the other forces at work in the campaign apparently succeeded in changing this Democratic majority into a slight Republican majority. Presumably the 1948 non-voters of a Republican inclination were joined in 1952 by enough defectors from the pool of non-voting Democrats (probably those least firmly committed to a Democratic position on issues) to create an NR group slightly larger than the remaining ND group. Considering this defection of recently, and perhaps only partially, converted Democrats in the NR ranks and the probability that irregular voters of both parties are less likely than their more regular cohorts to be sufficiently involved in politics to hold highly partisan attitudes, it is not surprising that the issue positions of the NR group should not be as partisan as those of the "regular" Republicans (RR's).

In summary, the data presented in this section appear to justify the following statements:

1. As a group Democratic voters were significantly more likely than Republican voters to support Democratic policies on all of the issues subjected to inquiry in this study.

¹² As shown in the 1948 Survey Research Center study and in as yet unpublished data from the present study.

2. The distributions of the "regular" Democrats.

3. The distributions of "Republican" than those of the American involvement in war partisan.

4. A comparison of the suggests that differences in the Republican party in issues as defined in this study.

A brief study of the republic enough to reveal that for balance of power in the 1952 voters were coming into the tally between the two parties voted in 1948 were voters in 1952. The net result for Republicans with an added share. In the same way, the Democratic population. As these were occurring, some eleven million votes from 1948 Democrats gain realized by the inactive voting status was in 1948, the movement was only by a shift of one percent. The switching of the Democratic people, it was also a Republican gain was also. All told, some 25 percent Democrats. Given this situation of pro-Democratic have salvaged the Democratic "shifting" voters had results which took place in the electorate would, at best, victory.

When the attitudes of "regular" voters of the between the extremes of position of the "regular" and foreign issues. It might go all the way to the in this respect they did

2. The distributions of the attitudes of "new" Democrats were very similar to those of "regular" Democrats.

3. The distributions of opinions of "new" Republicans were generally less "Republican" than those of the "regular" Republicans. The general issue of extent of American involvement in world affairs was the only one on which this group was highly partisan.

4. A comparison of the voting of "new" voters in 1948 and "new" voters in 1952 suggests that differences in the electoral situations of the two years resulted in gains for the Republican party in 1952 which were not primarily associated with partisan issues as defined in this study.

II. THE "SHIFTING" VOTERS

A brief study of the reported previous voting behavior of the 1952 voters is enough to reveal that former Democrats who voted for Eisenhower held the balance of power in the 1952 election. While sizeable numbers of 1948 non-voters were coming into the ranks of 1952 voters, dividing their favors rather equally between the two presidential aspirants, smaller numbers of people who had voted in 1948 were withdrawing from the political arena to become non-voters in 1952. The net result of these additions and subtractions left the Republicans with an added six per cent of the population supporting their cause. In the same way, the Democrats picked up slightly more than two per cent of the population. As these sizeable, but to some extent compensating, shifts were occurring, some eleven per cent of the citizens were deciding to change their votes from 1948 Democratic to 1952 Republican (DR's). Although the net gain realized by the Republicans from the movement to and from active or inactive voting status was enough to jeopardize the Democrats' slim margin of 1948, the movement of changing voters away from the Democrats (offset only by a shift of one per cent in the other direction) was of crucial importance. The switching of the DR changers was not only a movement of a larger number of people, it was also a movement of double importance inasmuch as each Republican gain was also a Democratic loss.

All told, some 25 per cent of the final Republican vote came from 1948 Democrats. Given this added Republican support, only an extreme combination of pro-Democratic shifts among other parts of the total electorate could have salvaged the Democratic party hopes for victory. Conversely, if these "shifting" voters had remained Democrats, DD's instead of DR's, the other shifts which took place within the groups moving into and out of the active electorate would, at best, have been barely sufficient to create an Eisenhower victory.

When the attitudes of these "shifting" voters are compared to those of the "regular" voters of the two parties it will be seen that they occupy a position between the extremes on every issue (Table III). Their disagreements with the position of the "regular" Democrats are about equally great for both domestic and foreign issues. It must be noted, however, that these former Democrats do not go all the way to the "regular" Republican position on any of these issues. In this respect they differ from the DR's of 1948 whose partisanship on the

issues of that year was scarcely less Republican than that of the 1948 RR's (see Figure 1).

The issue positions of the 1948 Democrats turned 1952 Republicans (DR's) resemble those of the 1952 Republicans who had not voted in 1948 (NR's). It will be recalled, however, that the NR's are made up of people of both Democratic and Republican party preference. Their intermediate position on issues appears to result from combining these two unlike groups as well as from their

TABLE III. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SHIFT OF VOTE, 1948-1952, AND ATTITUDES ON SIX 1952 CAMPAIGN ISSUES

Issue	1948-1952 Vote	Support Democratic Position	Neutral or Uncertain	Oppose Democratic Position	Total	Index of Partisanship
Governmental social welfare activity	DD	33%	64	3	100%	+30
	DR	22%	54	24	100%	-2
	RR	15%	46	39	100%	-24
Taft-Hartley	DD	36%	52	12	100%	+24
	DR	12%	61	27	100%	-15
	RR	7%	49	44	100%	-37
U. S. foreign involvement	DD	44%	11	45	100%	-1
	DR	35%	7	58	100%	-23
	RR	24%	6	70	100%	-46
U. S. China policy	DD	66%	19	15	100%	+51
	DR	47%	25	28	100%	+19
	RR	33%	22	45	100%	-12
U. S. entry in Korean war	DD	53%	14	33	100%	+20
	DR	41%	16	43	100%	-2
	RR	31%	19	50	100%	-19
Current U. S. Korean policy	DD	55%	5	40	100%	+15
	DR	38%	6	56	100%	-15
	RR	33%	6	61	100%	-25

relatively low level of political involvement (as inferred from their non-voting in 1948). This is not the case with the DR's; they were all voting Democrats in 1948. The fact that the distributions of their attitudes digress so clearly from those of the "regular" Democrats may be explained in either of two ways:

1. The 1952 DR's may have been people whose attitudes had never been as "Democratic" as those of other Democrats, who had voted Democratic in 1948 out of a sense of party loyalty and the lack of any impelling reason to do otherwise, but who were jolted loose from the Democratic party in 1952 by some non-issue factor or combination of factors which was present in the electoral situation of that year.

2. The 1952 DR's may have been no more or less Democratic in their views on issues in 1948 than were other Democrats. During the ensuing four years they may have been

converted from their Democratic positions. Having made this identification in 1952.

It is probably safe to assume that the 1952 DR's. If they had expected that there would be discrepancies from the "regular" voters, considering the evenness of the distribution, suggests that the "swing" voters are not so tightly bound to the Democratic party as issues or by simple partisanship were important at the time. This section may be summarized as follows:

1. The "shifting" voters are not so tightly bound to the Democratic party as the "regular" voters.
2. No single issue appeared to have converted 1948 Democrats to a 1952 Republican position.
3. It is suggested that the "shifting" voters are favoring the Republicans because of their Democratic position on party issues.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

The two preceding sections have dealt with the change in voting behavior and six issues of the 1952 campaign. The change in voting behavior is concerned with the question of whether the change in voting behavior were due to the electorate, or whether it was due to different socio-economic groups. The relevant demographic variables generally associated with the change in voting behavior, union membership, "regular" voters (DD's) and "swing" voters (DR's) and their overall issue stand¹³ and

Inter-group Comparisons of the different voting groups are presented in Table IV. Comparisons of the "regular" Republican voters (RR's) with the "regular" Democratic voters (DD's) and the "swing" voters (DR's) show that the "regular" voters took very narrow

¹³ By "overall issue standing," rather than the attitude on a single issue.

converted from their Democratic point of view to a more nearly Republican position on issues. Having made this ideological transition it was natural for them to vote Republican in 1952.

It is probably safe to assume that both these mechanisms were at work in creating the 1952 DR's. If the process had been mainly one of conversion one might have expected that the foreign policy issues might have shown greater discrepancies from the "regular" Democratic position than would the domestic issues, considering the events of the 1948-1952 period. The fact that this is not true suggests that the "switching" voters were largely people who were not sufficiently bound to the Democratic party by conviction regarding its position on issues or by simple party loyalty to withstand the pressure of other factors which were important at the time of the campaign.

This section may be summarized in the following statements:

1. The "shifting" voters fell between the "regular" voters of the two parties in their attitudes on the issues presented in this study.
2. No single issue appears to have exerted any special influence in the defection of 1948 Democrats to a 1952 Republican vote.
3. It is suggested that the "switching" voters were particularly susceptible to factors favoring the Republicans because of their comparative lack of conviction regarding the Democratic position on partisan issues.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPINGS WITHIN THE ELECTORATE

The two preceding sections have dealt with the relation between voting behavior and six issues of the presidential campaign, with particular emphasis on the change in voting behavior between 1948 and 1952. In this section we will be concerned with the question of whether the relations between these issues and voting behavior were essentially the same for all classes of people within the electorate, or whether there were differential relationships for people in different socio-economic groupings. Since space does not permit a discussion of all relevant demographic groups, the discussion will center around four of the variables generally associated with the New Deal-Fair Deal coalition—occupation, union membership, education, and religion. We will compare the "regular" voters (DD's and RR's) found in these different groupings on their overall issue stand¹³ and on their attitudes on two selected individual issues.

Inter-group Comparisons on Overall Issue Stands. The distributions of attitudes of the different voting groups within demographic categories are presented in Table IV. Comparing the distributions of the "regular" Democratic voters (DD's) from group to group, and examining the inter-group comparisons of the "regular" Republican voters (RR's), one finds a very high degree of similarity within the demographic groupings. This is particularly true of the Republican voters (RR's). Catholic and Protestant, union member and non-union member, businessman and farmer—all classifications of "regular" Republicans took very nearly the same overall Republican position on issues.

¹³ By "overall issue stand" we mean a summary score based on the attitudes on all six issues, rather than the attitude on an individual issue.

The "regular" Democrats show somewhat more variation from group to group. For example, there is a tendency for better educated DD's to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than their less highly educated party associates. These distributions are based on small samples, however, and the differences which appear are not large.

Although the "shifting" voters and the "new" voters are not presented in Table IV, some mention may be made of their distributions. The DR voters, shifting to the Republican candidate from a Democratic vote in 1948, take a general issue position between the "regular" Democrats and Republicans in nearly all of the socio-economic groupings considered. The ND's and NR's also tended to follow the ND and NR issue pattern described in the first section of this report in all of the demographic subgroups studied. The samples of these voting groups are too small to support detailed presentation.

Inter-group Comparisons on Two Individual Issues. It might be reasonably objected that the failure of these data to show any sizeable differences in attitudes between people drawn from very different circumstances of life may have resulted from the combining of scores from six separate issues. It is possible, for example, that two RR groups that are similar in their distributions of combined scores might show significant differences on individual issues, differences that cancel each other out when the issues are combined. An intensive analysis of all six issues for all demographic groups is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, to give some indication of the additional variations revealed by an analysis of individual issues, inter-group comparisons were made for the DD's and RR's on the most general domestic and foreign issues, those pertaining to government social welfare activity and foreign involvement. The data are presented in Tables V and VI.

These tables show a number of variations from the pattern described in Table IV. Perhaps most striking is the fact that the different RR groups, which showed such similarity in their overall issue scores, differ considerably on these two individual issues. This is particularly evident when the RR's of the different occupational groups are compared. The Republican voters of higher occupational status take a more Republican position on the general domestic issue than do the lower status occupation groups, but are less Republican on the general foreign issue. "Regular" Republicans among "blue-collar" workers are as a group extremely "isolationist" in their views on foreign involvement but they do not support the Republican position on the role of the federal government in domestic welfare programs. As might be expected, the variations among the "regular" Republicans of different educational background follow the same pattern as those associated with occupational differences.

Following the general "cross-pressure" hypothesis,¹⁴ one might be led to explain some of these differences among "regular" Republican voters of different educational and occupational groupings as resulting from the interaction of party position and group position in determining attitudes on issues. Thus, when the issue position dictated by one's party choice comes in conflict with

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIPS OF
OF 1948-1952 VOTERS

Group	1948 1952 Vote
Occupation:	
Professional and business	DD RR
White collar	DD RR
Skilled and semi-skilled	DD RR
Unskilled	DD RR
Farm operator	DD RR
Union Membership:	
Union	DD RR
Non-union	DD RR
Education:	
College	DD RR
High school	DD RR
Grade school	DD RR
Religion:	
Catholic	DD RR
Protestant	DD RR

* These figures were obtained from the 1948-1952 National Election Study.

¹⁴ P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, cited in n. 5.

TABLE IV. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SUMMARY SCORES ON CAMPAIGN ISSUES AND PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948-1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position*	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain*	Oppose Demo- cratic Position*	Total	Index of Parti- sanship*	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD RR	56% 28%	21 19	23 53	100% 100%	+33 -25	60 127
White collar	DD RR	49% 27%	25 22	26 51	100% 100%	+23 -24	33 51
Skilled and semi-skilled	DD RR	48% 23%	26 27	26 50	100% 100%	+22 -27	136 75
Unskilled	DD RR	46% 21%	27 27	27 52	100% 100%	+19 -31	49 20
Farm operator	DD RR	42% 21%	28 23	30 56	100% 100%	+12 -35	29 36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD RR	55% 24%	22 24	23 52	100% 100%	+32 -28	143 74
Non-union	DD RR	44% 25%	29 22	27 53	100% 100%	+17 -28	219 311
Education:							
College	DD RR	57% 28%	21 16	22 56	100% 100%	+35 -28	33 94
High school	DD RR	52% 24%	24 25	24 51	100% 100%	+28 -27	171 193
Grade school	DD RR	44% 22%	29 24	27 54	100% 100%	+17 -32	157 97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD RR	50% 26%	28 23	22 51	100% 100%	+28 -25	119 66
Protestant	DD RR	46% 24%	26 22	28 54	100% 100%	+18 -30	207 308

* These figures were obtained by adding the scores for all six issues and dividing by six.

TABLE V. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE
ACTIVITY AND PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	51%	49	0	100%	+51	60
	RR	15%	41	44	100%	-29	127
White collar	DD	27%	70	3	100%	+24	33
	RR	14%	47	39	100%	-25	51
Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	34%	61	5	100%	+29	136
	RR	24%	51	25	100%	-1	75
Unskilled	DD	24%	76	0	100%	+24	49
	RR	37%	53	10	100%	+27	20
Farm operator	DD	36%	61	3	100%	+33	29
	RR	8%	42	50	100%	-42	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	36%	62	2	100%	+34	143
	RR	27%	43	30	100%	-3	74
Non-union	DD	33%	63	4	100%	+29	219
	RR	13%	45	42	100%	-29	311
Education:							
College	DD	42%	55	3	100%	+39	33
	RR	13%	35	52	100%	-39	94
High school	DD	37%	59	4	100%	+33	171
	RR	15%	48	37	100%	-22	193
Grade school	DD	29%	68	3	100%	+26	157
	RR	20%	47	33	100%	-13	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	28%	71	1	100%	+27	119
	RR	19%	47	34	100%	-15	66
Protestant	DD	32%	63	5	100%	+27	207
	RR	15%	44	41	100%	-26	308

TABLE VI. RELATIONS
PATTER

Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:							
Professional and business	DD	51%	49	0	100%	+51	60
	RR	15%	41	44	100%	-29	127
White collar	DD	27%	70	3	100%	+24	33
	RR	14%	47	39	100%	-25	51
Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	34%	61	5	100%	+29	136
	RR	24%	51	25	100%	-1	75
Unskilled	DD	24%	76	0	100%	+24	49
	RR	37%	53	10	100%	+27	20
Farm operator	DD	36%	61	3	100%	+33	29
	RR	8%	42	50	100%	-42	36
Union Membership:							
Union	DD	36%	62	2	100%	+34	143
	RR	27%	43	30	100%	-3	74
Non-union	DD	33%	63	4	100%	+29	219
	RR	13%	45	42	100%	-29	311
Education:							
College	DD	42%	55	3	100%	+39	33
	RR	13%	35	52	100%	-39	94
High school	DD	37%	59	4	100%	+33	171
	RR	15%	48	37	100%	-22	193
Grade school	DD	29%	68	3	100%	+26	157
	RR	20%	47	33	100%	-13	97
Religion:							
Catholic	DD	28%	71	1	100%	+27	119
	RR	19%	47	34	100%	-15	66
Protestant	DD	32%	63	5	100%	+27	207
	RR	15%	44	41	100%	-26	308

ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE
BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENTTABLE VI. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND
PATTERNS OF 1948-1952 VOTING BEHAVIOR OF DIFFERENT
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS

Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases	Group	1948- 1952 Vote	Support Demo- cratic Position	Neu- tral or Uncer- tain	Oppose Demo- cratic Position	Total	Index of Parti- sanship	Number of Cases
Occupation:										
%	+51	60	Professional and business	DD	61%	2	37	100%	+24	60
	-29	127		RR	33%	3	64	100%	-31	127
%	+24	33	White collar	DD	41%	15	44	100%	-3	33
	-25	51		RR	33%	2	65	100%	-32	51
%	+29	136	Skilled and semi- skilled	DD	45%	7	48	100%	-3	136
	-1	75		RR	22%	4	74	100%	-52	75
%	+24	49	Unskilled	DD	42%	7	51	100%	-9	49
	+27	20		RR	0	10	90	100%	-90	20
%	+33	29	Farm operator	DD	22%	11	67	100%	-45	29
	-42	36		RR	14%	9	77	100%	-63	36
Union Membership:										
	+34	143	Union	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	143
	-3	74		RR	19%	7	74	100%	-55	74
	+29	219	Non-union	DD	40%	7	53	100%	-13	219
	-29	311		RR	26%	3	71	100%	-45	311
Education:										
	+39	33	College	DD	69%	9	22	100%	+47	33
	-39	94		RR	37%	2	61	100%	-24	94
	+33	171	High school	DD	46%	6	48	100%	-2	171
	-22	193		RR	25%	4	71	100%	-46	193
	+26	157	Grade school	DD	40%	8	52	100%	-12	157
	-13	97		RR	11%	6	83	100%	-72	97
Religion:										
	+27	119	Catholic	DD	53%	8	39	100%	+14	119
	-15	66		RR	24%	5	71	100%	-47	66
	+27	207	Protestant	DD	39%	6	55	100%	-16	207
	-26	308		RR	24%	4	72	100%	-48	308

the position that is congruent with one's membership in a given socio-economic grouping, one might predict that there would be a compromise between the two extremes. Conversely, when a group position coincides with a party position on an issue, the result might be expected to be a position more extreme than either would have been without the other. Accordingly, one might explain the failure of "blue-collar" Republicans as a group to support the Republican position on the government welfare activity issue as the result of a position dictated by socio-economic group interest counteracting the position associated with party choice. On the other hand, the extremely homogeneous support that the "regular" Republicans of lower education give to the Republican position on the issue of U. S. foreign involvement might be thought of as resulting from a reinforcement of the restricted world view common among people of lower education by a congruent party position.

Although this interpretation may be appropriate for these variations among the "regular" Republicans of different education and occupations, it does not explain other variations which appear in the tables. Unlike the patterns of the RR's, which are different for the two issues, the inter-group occupational and educational patterns for the "regular" Democrats are the same for both issues. On both the foreign and domestic issues there is a tendency for DD's of higher occupational status (professional people and businessmen) to take a more homogeneous Democratic position than that taken by "blue collar" workers, and there is a similar tendency for greater support of the Democratic position to be associated with higher education. In terms of socio-economic group interest one might have expected "blue collar" Democratic voters to show more support for activity of the federal government in social welfare programs than would be shown by Democrats of professional or businessman status, whereas, as indicated in Table V, they tend to show less.

A similar discrepancy appears when differences between the attitudes of the "regular" voters of the two main American religious groupings are examined. If one were to assume that American Catholics might have special reasons to support an internationalist position in current foreign policy, one would expect that Catholics of each party would react more favorably to the foreign involvement question than Protestants within that party. In fact Catholic Democrats do support the foreign involvement policy in somewhat larger proportion than do Protestant Democrats, but among Republicans there is no difference between Catholics and Protestants on this issue. So far as this issue is concerned religious group position appears to have some reinforcing influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Democratic party, but no modifying influence on the attitudes of Catholics who voted for the Republican party.

It is clear that these analyses of the interaction of the influences of party and socio-economic position are hazardous in the absence of the careful control of possible "third factors." More elaborate treatment of these data is not possible in the present article.

The data presented in this section may be summarized as follows:

1. When attitudes on the issues of "regular" Republican and religious classifications are compared, the attitudes of "regular" Democrats in the same religious classifications are more extreme than those of "regular" Republicans.
2. When distributions of attitudes on the issues are compared between demographic groups, the distributions of attitudes of "regular" Democrats are more extreme than those of "regular" Republicans.
3. The determination of variations in attitudes regarding issues is more complex when the simple juxtaposition of party position and demographic group is considered.

The analysis presented in this section shows that the two major parties in the United States have differing prominent campaign issues. The shifts in voting behavior which shifts in voting behavior from one party to the other, were associated with the issue positions of the parties. The party in order to study the issue positions and voting behavior. Although questions might arise which were chosen for the study, it proved to be highly practical and Republican voters showed a preference. Although other questions divided the voters significantly, Democrats and Republicans showed similar responses tapped by the question. It is also clear that "regular" voters of each party have different views on these issues. The switch from one party to the other is not a simple matter of attitude positions midway between the two parties.

Those people who had not voted in the previous election divided their votes between the two parties. The rest of the population was divided to which these new Democrats and Republicans were added. The new Democrats were added to the Democrats and the new Republicans were added to the Republicans. It is hypothesized that this distribution is not associated with the advantage of the Republican party. In the same manner the new Democrats but supported Eisenhower.

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arized as follows:

1. When attitudes on the six issue questions are combined into a single score, the positions of "regular" Republicans among the basic occupational, union, educational and religious classifications are seen to follow very similar distributions. This is also true of "regular" Democrats in these different categories.
2. When distributions of attitudes on two individual questions are considered, differences between demographic groupings within the two parties are apparent and significant.
3. The determination of variations between socio-economic groupings within parties in their attitudes regarding issues is too complicated to be adequately described by the simple juxtaposition of party position and socio-economic position.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis presented in this article was intended to show how the followers of the two major parties in the 1952 presidential election divided in their views regarding prominent campaign issues. It also sought to determine the extent to which shifts in voting behavior, from non-voting to voting and from one party to the other, were associated with attitudes on issues. Finally, it compared the issue positions of people of different socio-economic groupings within each party in order to study the influence of demographic position on relations between issue positions and votes.

Although questions might be raised regarding the selection of the specific issues which were chosen for study, it is noteworthy that all of the issues presented proved to be highly partisan, in the sense that they divided the Democratic and Republican voters to a degree that cannot be attributed to factors of chance. Although other questions might have been asked which would not have divided the voters significantly into party groupings, it is apparent that Democrats and Republicans differed in 1952 in their attitudes on the important issues tapped by the questions asked in this study.

It is also clear that "regular" party followers were as a group more partisan in their views on these issues than were people who do not vote regularly or who switch from one party to the other. The irregular voters as a group held attitude positions midway between the attitudes of regular Democrats and Republicans.

Those people who had not voted in 1948 but who voted in the 1952 election divided their votes between Eisenhower and Stevenson in about the same ratio as the rest of the population. There was a clear difference, however, in the degree to which these new Democratic or Republican voters shared the partisan position on issues of the party they supported. On the issues considered in this study, new Democrats were virtually as partisan as regular Democrats; new Republicans were significantly less partisan than regular Republicans. It is hypothesized that this discrepancy resulted from factors in the campaign situation, not associated with issues as defined in this study, which worked to the advantage of the Republican party.

In the same manner the shifting voters, those who had voted for Truman in 1948 but supported Eisenhower in 1952, were not as partisan as either the regu-

lar Republicans or Democrats in their views on the issues presented in this study. This leads to the supposition that these defectors, who made a critically important contribution to the total Eisenhower vote, were susceptible to the forces which led them to change their vote partly because they had no firm commitment to the Democratic position on foreign and domestic issues. By the same token, the fact that many of them have not accepted the Republican position on these issues implies that that party's hold on them is precarious.

Although the present article could not examine the effects of socio-economic position in great detail, the data are sufficient to indicate that they do not follow an entirely consistent pattern. Although in some cases factors associated with socio-economic position appeared to counteract party position as a determiner of attitudes, in other instances attitudes associated with party position seemed virtually unaffected by socio-economic differences. This question requires much fuller exploration before it can be adequately answered.

Finally, the reader is reminded again that the present article is a preliminary analysis taken from a study of much broader scope. It is hoped that some of the questions which are left unanswered in this presentation will be more adequately treated in the more comprehensive report which will be forthcoming.

The preceding discussion is only as these characteristics of campaign issues. The distribution of the 1950 election with the comparison. They show considerable educational, social, and economic differences. The most striking difference was the Republican vote of the population. The unskilled and semi-skilled workers showed a large scale defection toward the Republican vote. This was especially considered to be a surprise, since the sample, went from a population of the Republican vote heavily into the group, the only group which already had a high occupational level. The numbers of cases add to the total number of small number of cases represented or f

TABLE 1. RELATIONSHIP

Voted for:	Profession
	1948
Democrat	15%
Republican	57
Did not vote	25
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3
Total	100%
Number of Cases	117

* Less than one-half

* The figures for the Survey Research

APPENDIX I

The preceding discussion has dealt with demographic characteristics and the vote only as these characteristics related to differential commitment on a number of campaign issues. Since there may be some interest in data on the overall distribution of the 1952 vote in different demographic groupings, and a comparison with the comparable distributions in 1948, the following tables are presented. They show comparisons between the 1948 and 1952 vote of the occupational, educational, and religious groupings discussed in this report, as well as a number of others on which there are comparable data.¹⁵

The most striking impression gained from these tables is that the shift toward the Republicans in 1952 was a general one which affected many different classes of the population. Some components of the "Democratic coalition"—skilled and semi-skilled workers, Catholics, young voters, union members—showed large scale defections from their Democratic preference in 1948. The shift toward the Republicans was equally marked among groups which are not usually considered to be members of this "coalition." White collar workers, for example, went from an even vote distribution in 1948 to a ratio of almost 2 to 1 in favor of the Republicans; farmers, who had favored the Democrats in 1948, swung heavily into the Republican column in 1952. Except for the Negro group, the only groups which showed no shift in favor of the Republicans were those which already had a traditionally heavy Republican majority—the high status occupational and educational groups.

The numbers of cases of the separate demographic classifications do not always add to the total sample of 1614 respondents. This results from the omission of small numbers of respondents who did not fall into the classifications represented or from whom the relevant information was not obtained.

TABLE 1. RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Occupation									
	Professional and Managerial		Other White Collar		Skilled and Semi-Skilled		Unskilled		Farmers	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	15%	27%	38%	28%	52%	40%	33%	40%	25%	24%
Republican	57	60	39	52	15	34	12	19	13	42
Did not vote	25	12	18	19	29	26	49	41	54	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	1	5	1	4	*	6	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	117	333	79	155	164	462	85	174	105	178

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

¹⁵ The figures for the 1948 vote are based on the study of the 1948 election conducted by the Survey Research Center.

TABLE 2. INCOME IN RELATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Income					
	Low†		Medium†		High†	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	28%	22%	36%	35%	29%	28%
Republican	16	31	24	40	46	57
Did not vote	53	47	33	24	20	14
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	3	*	7	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	179	312	327	852	149	415

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† Low income: 1948, \$0-\$1,999; 1952, \$0-\$1,999.

Medium income: 1948, \$2,000-\$3,999; 1952, \$2,000-\$4,999.

High income: 1948, \$4,000 and over; 1952, \$5,000 and over.

TABLE 3. RELATION OF LABOR UNION MEMBERSHIP TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	"Does Respondent or Head of Family Belong to a Labor Union?"			
	Yes		No	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	56%	42%	25%	26%
Republican	13	33	32	46
Did not vote	27	24	38	27
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	1	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	150	439	493	1165

TABLE 4. RELATION

Voted for:
Democrat
Republican
Did not vote
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.
Total
Number of Cases

* Less than one-half

TABLE 5. RELATION

Voted for:
Democrat
Republican
Did not vote
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.
Total
Number of Cases

* Less than one-half

IN 1948 AND 1952

	High†	
1952	1948	1948
5%	29%	29%
	46	57
	20	14
	5	1
%	100%	100%
	149	415

TABLE 4. RELATION OF EDUCATION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Education					
	Grade School		High School		College	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	35%	30%	34%	34%	17%	24%
Republican	16	31	29	46	55	65
Did not vote	44	38	33	20	20	10
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	4	*	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	293	660	266	712	99	238

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

VOTING BEHAVIOR

of Family Belong
ion?"

No	
1948	1952
25%	26%
32	46
38	27
5	1
100%	100%
193	1165

TABLE 5. RELATION OF RELIGION TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Religion			
	Protestant		Catholic	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	25%	26%	49%	43%
Republican	28	45	25	41
Did not vote	43	29	20	15
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	*	6	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	461	1156	140	343

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 6. RELATION OF TYPE OF COMMUNITY TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Population Classification					
	Metropolitan Areas†		Towns and Cities		Open Country	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	47%	33%	27%	31%	24%	25%
Republican	32	43	30	42	12	41
Did not vote	17	22	38	27	59	33
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	4	2	5	*	5	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	181	438	354	928	127	218

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

† "Metropolitan Area" includes the suburban areas and a few rural areas surrounding the big cities. When only the actual big city dwellers are considered, the distribution of the 1952 vote shows an approximately equal Democratic-Republican division, not the 4 to 3 ratio indicated in this table.

TABLE 7. RELATION OF RACE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Race			
	White		Negro	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	33%	32%	18%	26%
Republican	29	46	10	6
Did not vote	33	21	64	67
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	8	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	585	1453	61	157

TABLE 8. RELATION C

Voted for:

Democrat
Republican
Did not vote
Not ascertained, voted
other, etc.

Total
Number of Cases

* Less than one-half of one

TABLE 9. RELATION

Voted for: 21-

1948

Democrat 32%
Republican 18
Did not vote 44
Not ascertained, voted
other, etc. 6

Total 100%
Number 198

* Less than one-half of one

Reproduced here are
which were explicitly in-
dicated by each question giv-
ing to indicate Pro-D
each issue:

GOVERNMENTAL SOC
Social government should
ment, education, housing,
too much. On the whole,
about right, too much, or

G BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

on Classification

owns and Cities	Open Country	
	1948	1952
1952		
31%	24%	25%
42	12	41
27	59	33
*	5	1
100%	100%	100%
928	127	248

and a few rural areas surrounding
considered, the distribution of the
Republican division, not the 4 to

OR IN 1948 AND 1952

Race

Negro	
1948	1952
18%	26%
10	6
64	67
8	1
100%	100%
61	157

TABLE 8. RELATION OF SEX TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Sex			
	Male		Female	
	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	36%	34%	29%	28%
Republican	28	45	26	41
Did not vote	31	20	40	31
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	5	1	5	*
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Cases	303	738	356	876

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

TABLE 9. RELATION OF AGE TO VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1948 AND 1952

Voted for:	Age							
	21-34		35-44		45-54		55 and over	
	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952	1948	1952
Democrat	32%	31%	38%	34%	33%	33%	27%	27%
Republican	18	37	24	41	37	45	31	48
Did not vote	44	32	33	25	25	21	36	23
Not ascertained, voted other, etc.	6	*	5	*	5	1	6	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number	198	485	174	381	126	284	156	442

* Less than one-half of one per cent.

APPENDIX II

Reproduced here are the questions related to the seven campaign issues which were explicitly included in the questionnaire. The code categories following each question give in detail the manner in which responses were combined to indicate Pro-Democratic, Anti-Democratic or Neutral attitudes on each issue:

GOVERNMENTAL SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVITY: "Some people think the national government should do more in trying to deal with such problems as unemployment, education, housing, and so on. Others think that the government is already doing too much. On the whole, would you say that what the government has done has been about right, too much, or not enough?"

Pro-Democratic

Definitely should do more

Should do more

Should do more on some, don't know or same on others

Anti-Democratic

Should do less

Definitely should do less

Should do less on some, don't know or same on others

Neutral

About right, OK

Should do more on some, less on others

Don't know

FEPC: "There is a lot of talk these days about discrimination, that is, people *having* trouble getting jobs because of their race. Do you think the government *ought to take* an interest in whether Negroes have trouble getting jobs or should it stay out *of this* problem? Do you think we need laws to deal with this problem or are there other *ways* that will handle it better? Do you think the national government should handle *this or* do you think it should be left for each state to handle in its own way? Do you think *the* state governments should do something about this problem or should they stay *out of it* (also)?"

Pro-Democratic

National government should pass laws *and* do other things too

National government should pass laws

State government should pass laws *and* do other things too

State government should pass laws

Government should take an interest, not ascertained how

Anti-Democratic

Government should do other things *only*National government should stay out, *but* state government should take *action*

Government (national and state) should stay out entirely

Respondent favors restrictive legislation (include here clear anti-Negro statements)

Neutral

Don't know

TAFT-HARTLEY LABOR LAW REVISION: "Have you heard anything *about the* Taft-Hartley Law? (If yes) How do you feel about it—do you think it's all right *as it is*, do you think it should be changed in any way, or don't you have any feelings *about it*? (If should be changed) Do you think the law should be changed just a little, *changed* quite a bit, or do you think it should be completely repealed?"

Pro-Democratic

Completely repealed

Changed quite a bit—in favor of labor

Changed quite a bit—not ascertained in whose favor

Changed a little—in favor of labor

Anti-Democratic

Changed quite a bit—in favor of management.

Changed a little—in favor of management

Changed a little—not ascertained in whose favor

All right as it is

Neutral

Changed, not ascertained how much

Don't know

Never heard of Taft-Hartley

U. S. FOREIGN INVOLV
world war this country has
of the world. How do you f

Pro-Democratic

Disagree, with qualific

Disagree

Anti-Democratic

Agree

Agree, with qualificati

Neutral

Pro-con, depends

Don't know

U. S. CHINA POLICY: "C
China went communistic—
How do you feel about this

Pro-Democratic

Nothing we could do t

Anti-Democratic

It was our fault

It was our fault, with

Neutral

Don't know

U. S. ENTRY IN KOREA
into the fighting in Korea

Pro-Democratic

Yes, did the right thin

Anti-Democratic

No, should have staye

Neutral

Pro-con

Don't know

CURRENT U. S. KOREA
would be best for us to do
trying to get a peaceful s
and China?"

Pro-Democratic

Keep on trying to get

Anti-Democratic

Pull out of Korea ent

Take a stronger stand

Unable to choose bet

Neutral

Don't know

U.S. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT: "Some people think that since the end of the last world war this country has gone too far in concerning itself with problems in other parts of the world. How do you feel about this?"

Pro-Democratic

Disagree, with qualifications

Disagree

Anti-Democratic

Agree

Agree, with qualifications

Neutral

Pro-con, depends

Don't know

U.S. CHINA POLICY: "Some people feel that it was our government's fault that China went communistic—others say there was nothing that we could do to stop it. How do you feel about this?"

Pro-Democratic

Nothing we could do to stop it

Anti-Democratic

It was our fault

It was our fault, with qualifications (partially our fault)

Neutral

Don't know

U.S. ENTRY IN KOREAN WAR: "Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Korea two years ago or should we have stayed out?"

Pro-Democratic

Yes, did the right thing

Anti-Democratic

No, should have stayed out

Neutral

Pro-con

Don't know

CURRENT U. S. KOREAN POLICY: "Which of the following things do you think it would be best for us to do now in Korea?" (1) Pull out of Korea entirely? (2) Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement? (3) Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China?"

Pro-Democratic

Keep on trying to get a peaceful settlement

Anti-Democratic

Pull out of Korea entirely

Take a stronger stand and bomb Manchuria and China

Unable to choose between above two alternatives

Neutral

Don't know